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THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL MONISM IN THE COUNTRIES OF POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION (IDENTIFICATION OF THE CRISIS CAUSE)

The two decades of duration, depth and intensity of the crisis, with all the accompanying painful events, have not been a sufficient warning to the holders of neo-liberal economic policy in the neighbouring SEE states that something is wrong and that the «development» model ultimately needs to be changed. The paper discusses the causes and conditions that have disabled the pluralistic, even correctly monistic acting of economic institutes in the practice of transitional countries and led to their objective substitution by the quasi-institutes and meta-institutes of socio-pathological nature. It emphasizes the primary importance of economic institutions for development, as well as for the destructive effect of pseudo-institute on economic policy and valorisation of economic resources. In addition to this, the article is providing evidence that monistic pseudo-market reforms in the period of post-socialist transition haven't succeeded in compensating for a vast institutional vacuum, and that they have even led to its spreading and turning into a quasi-institutionalization, and then in the institutional nihilism. We start from the hypothesis that the regulation of social and economic processes in post social transition hasn't been developing in accordance with scientific-methodological dualistic discussions on institutional monism and/or pacificator institutional pluralism, but has been subjected to recombined and decadent meta-institute of total control by the ruling nomenclatures, that led to the phenomenon of institutional nihilism.

Key words: *Economic Institution, Institutional Pluralism, Institutional Monism, Neo-Liberalism, Transition Economies.*

1. Introduction

Post-socialist transition was conducted as a velvet revolution and as a response to the socialistic tyranny (the party, goals, slogans, promises). However, the recombination of old and new form of tyranny was being enforced. New and larger problems, contradictions, crisis, poverty, disintegration and uncertainty occurred. Socialist vices were packed in new, more dangerous robe. The common denominator of socialist and post-socialist economic and social problems is the institutional vacuum dominated by disrupted market institutional monism. Proclaimed competition is replaced with various forms of monopoly.

Many authors rightfully emphasize the significance of coordination as the process of mutual harmonization of certain economic institutes of market regulations and state regulations, and appropriate forms of ownership (private and government). That way, they directly advocate for equality, inter-conditionality and mutual effects of economic institutes as constituents of the mutual economic mechanism of coordination and

regulation. In other words, they correctly detect the imperative need for the acting of institutional pluralism instead of rhetoric's (rather than practice) on institutional monism.

The failure of post socialism transition undoubtedly resulted from the application of fatal «reform» politics with double standards. Under the rhetorical neo-liberal mask of the market, competition, entrepreneurship, and freedoms, the politics and strategy of «reformers» were oriented toward non-marketable process, motivated strictly by individual interests, instead of propagated social and economic results. Social and human values were degraded. Everything or nearly everything was out of control. Wrong and retrograded processes were abundantly materially awarded, and social and economic results were catastrophic. Focusing on the learning process and neglecting results is possible only in the conditions of institutional underdevelopment, which enables the «flourishing» of interest-oriented errors and ambitions and their active impact on the economic politics.

In post-social period, the system of alternative institutes has been created. It comprises various sociopathological creations, grey economy, endurance in the application of wrong monistic recipes of neo-liberal «shock therapy», compensating for the strictness of formal rules by their non-performance, corruption, attenuation of property rights, formation of various behaviour stereotypes, actuation of informal behaviours (spreading institutional conflicts) etc. There's no doubt that the economic institute of the state government, politically structured and determined, during the transition period was an «alternatively» directed instrument serving certain beneficiaries (the privileged ones), performing its patronizing and redistributive role in a vulgarized way, under the form of neo-liberal strategy.

Crisis challenges may, in principle, have only one efficient response, which is the same at the global, regional or local level. It anticipates focusing and coordination of five development «i»-factors: institutes, infrastructure, innovations, investment and information (conditionally: knowledge) (V. Drašković, 2010, p. 20).

The paper makes distinction between the institutional vacuum that featured the initial period of transition and run-in institutional nihilism, which resulted from the long-term change in the «pathology of the neo-liberal model» discussed by M. Mesarić (2011, p. 12). It has led to the creation of socially irresponsible and immoral mutant economic and social order, the alleged «version of capitalism», but «without a human face», which is completely opposite from the models suggested by S. Young (2003), P. Aburdene (2005) and other authors.

There is no matter how versatile modern theoretical approaches are, and how frequent considering of the institutional problems of the economic growth and development are, the questions of the concrete contents, of the dynamics and improvements of the economic institutes, and especially of their functional applications in the traditional economics, do not have deep and complex basis, nor satisfying analytical and practical answers, up to now. All is reduced to the descriptive scientific approach. This was in a way the initial hypothesis for formulating the subject matter of this paper. They consist in an attempt of identifying real and concrete reasons of reproducing the institutional vacuum in the transitional economics. Simultaneously these are the reasons of the clash between the formal rules and their slow and weak usability in the practice.

Though, this paper attempts to explain: a) the essence of neglecting the real institutionalization in the post socialism countries, through the identification of the quasi-institutionalization model and the short analysis of the mentioned reasons, and b) the paradox of the established phenomenon that the institutes as the rules and constrains became the barrier for their unlimited avoiding and quasi-institutionalization.

2. Transition: the beginning, institutional vacuum and the institutional nihilism

Institutional monism experiment in post-socialist countries began in socialism, somewhere before (1917, Russia) and somewhere later (1945, Yugoslavia). It is characterized by:

- open repression of the government system, dominance of bureaucratic statism and management (command economy) along with planning naturalization of commodity-money relations and undeveloped and unorganized market,
- economic inefficiency caused by the system destimulation, paternalism, employees' lack of interests, fictitious employment etc.,
- ideological and political subjectivism and dogmatism, which caused dissatisfaction among people as well as numerous socio-pathological phenomena,
- ideological blurring of the essence of economic reality, which was dominated by monopolistic structures,
- false collectivism of organized economic and political coercion, and equality at a low level of satisfying needs,
- vicious and controversial circle of fundamental system elements (public ownership, monopoly of the state sector, total planning determination – the road to communism) and
- many negative consequences, such as price disparities, trade deficits, trade imbalances, speculative market, the dual exchange services of *rublja*, low living standards, extensive economic growth, economic stagnation and crisis, totalitarianism reproduction in all areas of life and work, etc.

The implementation of general social and economic reform («perestroika») began in 1985. in the USSR, with a demand for «more socialism». The results were devastating. They showed that something is much easier to proclaim than to achieve. It was not easy to bring down the house which had been built for decades based on directives, slogans and false promises, on the one hand, and enthusiasm, persecution and sacrifice, on the other. In the early 90s, post-socialist transition began in Russia, in all former USSR states and other countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. It implied radical economic and social reforms, transition from authoritarianism to democracy, pluralism to monism, from socialism to a mixed progress society, from formational to civilizational development.

Key control and other instruments of the socialist regulation of the state were rapidly destroyed, whereas new instruments were insufficiently formed and they were not duly adapted to meet market principles and requirements even in their reduced form. Rapid and non-selective removal of the «created» state property and its conversion into private ownership has further weakened the institute of state regulation. Handling the main levers of economic system was reduced whereas its un-systematic features were increased, the economy was criminalized and many forms of quasi-institutionalization were expanded. Corrective activity of the state regulation «from above» is absent, which should accelerate the development of other economic institutes (the market regulation and property rights), which were separately developed in monistic and metastatic fashion. Closely privileged motivation and entrepreneurial initiative of rare individuals was forced.

Privatization was not conducted in accordance with certain legal and economic criteria; therefore it did not create the conditions for increasing the economic efficiency and economic freedom. It usually presents an insufficient condition for economic efficiency as its main promoters are the competition, management improvement, efficient and flexible regulation of the state. Competition is reduced to primitive market structures whereas the monopolies took advantage of all the chances that occurred (that were made possible for the privileged individuals). The lack of economic efficiency as the undisputed target functions and / or basic privatization criteria says enough about its failure. Transition dogmas were formed replacing the socialist ones

with an uncertain shelf life and altered value criteria ranging from ‘shock therapy’ through the theological replacement of goals of economic growth end development (finding the way out of the crisis, economic growth, efficiency) with the means (liberalization, privatization, democratization, institutionalization, stabilization), to the socio-pathological demagoguery and rhetoric which were used to create the alleged real institutional changes (V. Drašković, 2010, p. 12).

«*Woe account of socialism*» (S.S. Shatalin) was replaced by a new mutant order, which did not lead to the desired prosperity. Nations still pay other people’s accounts for the failure of «reforms» that were focused on the narrow interests of new «elites», the crisis intensified and reproduced, the enormous polarization between the impoverished nation and the enriched rare privileged individuals, while dissatisfaction is huge. The cause must be sought in the concealment, vulgarization and abuse of institutional changes.

Table 1

Growth in real GDP, 1989 to 2009e (for selected transition countries)

<i>State</i>	<i>Index 2009 (1989=100)</i>	<i>Average per Year</i>
Poland	180	3,0
Czech Republic	137	1,6
Estonia	128	1,2
Hungary	127	1,2
Slovenia	144	1,8
<i>Central Europe and the Baltic states</i>	150	2,0
Bosnia and Hercegovina	81	-0,1
Bulgaria	109	0,4
FYR Macedonia	100	0
Montenegro	88	-1,1
Romania	118	0,8
Serbia	69	-2,9
<i>South-Eastern Europe</i>	107	0,3
Armenia	131	1,4
Belarus	156	2,2
Georgia	58	-3,7
Ukraine	60	-2,5
Russia	99	0
<i>Eastern Europe and the Caucasus</i>	91	-0,5
All transition countries	131	1,4

Source: adapted from Domazet, 2010, p. 15.

The transition to a mixed institutional economics in China of the 80s and 90s is the evidence that the gradation transition is much easier and more efficient than the «shock therapy». The Chinese have proved in practice their wise saying that «*it does not matter what color is the cat, while it catches mice.*» In addition, they relativized assertions of many Western economists regarding incompatibility of the market and socialism («Spontaneous evolution and cognitive control» – F. Hayek). There are differences between some regions, as shows table below, because China’s GDP, at purchasing power parity (PPP), was 80 per cent of that of the US in 2009, and «*by 2014, at current rates of relative growth, China’s economy will pass the US, in absolute size, to be the biggest in the world*» (Wolf, 2010).

Table 2

Real GDP in PPP for selected Regions (annual average, %)

	US	EU-15	<i>China</i>	Latin America	Middle East	Africa	Central & Eastern Europe
1990	1,7	2,5	<i>3,5</i>	0,5	7,6	1,7	5,8
1995	2,5	2,6	<i>14,1</i>	0,6	2,1	2,6	5,9
2000	4,1	3,8	<i>8,6</i>	4,2	5,2	3,7	4,8
2001	1,1	2,0	<i>10,2</i>	0,5	2,9	4,4	0,4
2005	3,0	1,8	<i>9,9</i>	4,5	5,0	5,4	5,7
2009	-2,7	-4,4	<i>8,7</i>	-2,0	1,7	2,8	-4,1
2010	2,7	1,5	<i>9,1</i>	5,7	4,0	4,2	2,5

Source: adapted from Domazet, 2010, pp. 65–66.

Neither the fiasco (failure) of the market, nor all the strains of the market, or even many economic crises that build upon each other, or even fatal consequences of the transition are sufficient to understand the illusion and deception of institutional market monism. Consistent application of even that part of the state regulation referring to the rules of conduct (probably equal for all?) would be sufficient to eliminate all irregularities, negativity, and deformation that marked the «rule of law» and «entrepreneurship policy» of neo-liberal «reformers.» A complete distrust in the institute of state regulation is neither logical nor productive and is not appropriate for increasing IT, production, innovative, financial and civilization integrations. Even if we ignore government economic functions (in the part of macroeconomic policy), we must wonder: why has its legal and control function failed, without even being questioned by anyone? It is clear that the political decisions influence the economic decisions that were focused on maximizing personal advantage of privileged individuals. Let us remember that the Nobel laureate D. North (1981, p. 32) wrote three decades ago: «*The dominant goal of the capitalist state is the construction of such institutional structures, especially the structure of ownership rights, using which it achieves maximization of income (social welfare-remark by the author) and a high degree of freedom*» (through minimization of costs for specification and protection of property rights – remark by author). Where are those so frequently propagated economic freedoms?

But let us not forget, those very rules are the institutes themselves! Code of Conduct is the synonym for institutional pluralism! Here lies the main methodological paradox and essence of fraud: the code of conduct should exist, but the government that controls it tolerates (and allows) departures from it to some (the privileged ones)! The above paradox gave birth to a new (logically derived) paradox: An order has been created (predatory model) in which none of the institutional monisms acted consistently: neither the market regulation, nor government regulation! The transitional logic of social changes has favoured the establishment of this model, dominated by the formation of recombined meta-institute of completely controlled by the ruling nomenclatures.

Economic development of post-socialist countries is based on permanent discrepancy between rhetoric on pluralistic institutional changes and monistic implementation of neo-liberal recipes of macroeconomic politics. The latter one has been extremely motivated by interests of insatiable appetites of state nomenclatures, which represented the main obstacle for institutional changes, apart from noticeable socio-pathologic milieu. All of this resulted in long-term destabilisation of economic systems through disinvestments and spilling over of positive effects in spending instead of production. Institutional innovations are, when it comes to timing, structure, quality, quantity and functionality, undeveloped compared to other transitional changes, instead of being their foundation, stimulant and a guarantee.

There has been a huge gap between formally established economic institutes from foreign economic policies and economic behaviour in practice, which was far from standard norms. A strategic significance of practical institutional innovations was disregarded as well as their priority role compared to economic politics. Vulgarized individualism was imposed by certain «skilful and capable entrepreneurs» («efficient owners») as a social and civilization norm. Such reduced individualism (of the privileged) became very fast a foundation of formal institutional monism as theoretic and ideological basis for neo-liberal economic politics (which resembles economic «Reseller Fog» i. e. «selling of nothing» – without consequences for sellers.) The main cause of the mentioned phenomenon is a paradoxical need for the public economic policy to serve private interests.

The neo-liberals that constantly refer to F. Hayek are forgetting that he has clearly written about the necessity of acting according to the rules, because without them market coordination presents a hardly attainable process. Among other things, it proves neo-liberal arbitrariness, bluff, fiction and neo-bolshevism (in terms of: saying one thing, thinking something quite different while doing the third), which are one-way directed towards the achievement of personal material interests. All economic theories, in this way or another, refer to adherence to certain rules, linking economic coordination with them. Quasi-neo-liberals are referring only to phrases! And to the establishment of the total control rules by the privileged non-marketably enriched «elite»! Unfortunately, this «order» has been functioning for two decades! Within this order the individualism of the privileged substituted mass individualism (of all) – in all important segments of society and economy: the economic freedom, entrepreneurship, private property, etc. In this way, the choice of all has been reduced to individual choices. Can the concept of the freedom of choice be reduced to the freedom of choice of the few, whoever they are? This is only possible in the chaos of disrupted and destroyed value criteria. A Comparison with developed economies and societies is the best indicator of transitional institutional nihilism, which is formed under the dominant influence of vulgarized neo-liberal (nihilistic) ideology.

Institutional nihilism is defined as: the situation created after the long-term anti-institutional action, intentional blockade of realistic institutional changes, promotion of quasi-institutional and meta-institutional changes, long-term effects of vulgarized neo-liberal institutional monism, and long-term reproduction of institutional vacuum.

The «alternative institutes» to a great extent turn the story on institutionalisation into the opposite. Instead of the stabilization of the natural ambient, it has been additionally destabilized, instead of the incrementality of institutional changes, they have been negatively substituted with «alternative» quasi-institutionalisation. The domination of political (party) interests functionally subordinated all economic institutes, especially in the part of the allocation of property rights. That way, all significant economic processes, economic policies and main events are being controlled. What is being forced is the super ordination of the «alternative» informal codes of conduct over formal institutes, with parallel processes of great interests. The economic imperialism from neoinstitutional theory has been literally copied and pasted to post socialist practice of the transition countries. Wrong post-socialist economic policies in the transition countries contributed to the creation of a specific brake and crisis transitional model «23 d» (adapted according to: V. Drašković 2007, p. 93), which is made of:

- deformation (of the economic reality, entrepreneurship, value criteria, competition, market principles),
 - deficit (of the rule of law, developed democracy, institutional environment and changes),
 - deregulation (excessive, non-selective, interest-motivated),
 - degeneration (of the institutional environment, market structure and the healthy competition),
 - disinvestment (mercantilist orientation in the selling of key economic facilities),
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- destructivity (of the neo-liberal economic policies, government nomenclature),
- differentiations (social, between rich and poor),
- deviations (transition, institutional, motivational, enrichment at all costs, civilizational standards, freedom of choice)
- disproportion (economic, between promises and results),
- domination (politics over economics, institutional monism over pluralism, individualism over mass phenomena, monopoly, social pathology, totalitarianism),
- discrimination (against real economic freedom, middle class),
- dictates (of the new «elite» party coalition, the party in power, institutional imitation and improvisation),
- determination (philosophy of a leader),
- demagoguery (of neo-liberal economic ideas and rhetorical alibi-liberals, alleged «reformist», which have abundantly profited in this rhetoric, switching hypothesis in terms of individualism and mass, etc.),
- duality (rhetoric and practice, individualism and mass, wealth and poverty, democracy and partyocracy, enjoyment and survival, protectionism and neo-liberalism),
- dichotomy (of the economic institute of state and market regulation),
- dogmatism (of neo-liberal recipes),
- disorientation (of economic agents, population),
- disorganization (of all social subsystems, lack of institutional control)
- destabilization (of the economy and society, reproduction of the crisis),
- degradation (of economic, social, moral values, economic freedom, private initiative and entrepreneurship),
- denationalization (carried out as a robbery), and
- demotivation (population, for work and creativity).

The above mentioned model «23 d» is characterised by the functioning of «rapacious country», which substituted the «country of development», eroding the socialist institutes and creating an institutional vacuum, which turned into an institutional nihilism. This has enabled the initial rapacious mass privatisation and later on the so called «*privatisation of gains and nationalisation of losses*» (May 2008, p. 7). Instead of pursuing the real institutionalization, violence against it was carried out, under the banner of spreading of individual freedoms. The fact is that, when freedom lacks moral, legal, environmental and other social restrictions, greed becomes the drive for the enrichment of individuals at any cost. Economic behaviour in practice is far from the regular norms and rules because it is controlled by subjective regulators. Distorted and reduced individualism is being imposed as social and civilization norm. (V. Drašković, M. Drašković 2009a, pp. 22–25).

In these conditions, a consistent development strategy and a successful economic policy cannot be created or implemented. All conceptual elaborations are being blocked and modified through political decisions and choices that are motivated by the interests of the creators of «reforms». Coping with economic and ideological myths and stereotypes continue to fail. Real need of institutionalization and institutional complementarities are being ignored as well as the development of science, education, public interest, effective owner as a mass phenomenon and an efficient economy. Sustainable development is being delayed as well as creation of competitive skills and competences etc.

3. Questions unanswered by the postsocialist «reformers»

The most consistent stands on the market self-sufficiency and the spontaneous «Messiahs» have been occupied for decades by neo-classicists and neo-liberals. They wrote and still write (I do not think they really believe in all that they write?) that all economic problems will be solved by prices, competition, private property and entrepreneurship.

What are prices? Are they monopolistic? Non-marketable purchase of factories, lands, businesses, facilities and other at extremely low prices dominated. Later, the same is sold by hundredfold higher prices, according to the daily media reports. Regardless of the fact that according to the law, privatized assets may be sold only if paid at the market price of that time. However, in countries with rule of institutional nihilism, the rigor of the law simply compensates for its failure to comply.

What is competition? Is it also monopolistic? How can a robbed and impoverished nation compete with rich tycoons? What is private property? The one privatized by robbing. Which are effective owners? The privileged ones enriched by non-market means and by plundering of state property? A huge amount of capital is converted into «dead» assets, which are not being transformed into investments, new factories, businesses and new possibilities for employment. What is entrepreneurship? Privileged? And where is that market equilibrium? As much as it is conceptually and theoretically abstract, however, it personifies a certain economic harmony, rather than the existing anarchy, which is being reproduced for years and decades.

What is the nature of those (secret, tycoon) contracts through which the people, economy and state are being devastated, in favour of the signatories – the local «elite» and the suspicious, mostly unknown foreign investors? And to which extent is the social pathology included in it? Where are the welfare and equitableness that the state should provide according to the institutionalists? In particular, where is the efficiency of the market? Where is the state as a guarantor of economic freedom and equal implementation of formal rules of economic game?

Economy institutes have been replaced by pseudo-forms (imitation and improvisation), such as: meta-institutionalization (creation of over-institutes and institutes of total control), institutional monism («messianic» uncontrolled market without parallel formation of complementary institutes) and the quasi-institutionalization (paternalism, monopoly, lobbying, social pathology, grey economy, annuity-oriented behaviour, naturalization, street currency conversion, dominance of politics over economy, robbing privatization, privileged «newly established entrepreneurs» as alleged «efficient owners» etc. The effect of these obstructive factors in the period of post-socialist transition in the SEE countries was synergistic and destructive.

Pseudo-institutional violence (political, economic and party) of organized minority (who can do what they want where they want when they want and how they will) over disorganized majority, verified the non-marketable appropriation of enormous proportions. Therefore, some authors identify neo-liberalism with neo-darwinism, (Kulic, 2000, p. 867), even with neo-imperialism.

Institutional synergism (pluralism) is the only real, possible and proven condition and priority for economic development, based on real (rather than rhetoric) economic freedoms, protected property rights and contracts, entrepreneurship and a healthy market competition. It allows the individualism of all, mass economic freedom, private property and efficient entrepreneurs, i.e., mass and institutionalized individuality, property, state and market. Since the goal of economic institutions is to serve all individuals in the society (not just the privileged ones). Individual and collective are inseparable components of pluralistic institutional arrangements and the overall system of contemporary developed economies.

In the transition countries of SEE, democratic institutions exist nominally (formally). They sometimes serve as a cover (valve) for the expression and realization of the interests of distribution coalitions, which consist of individual members of the old nomenclature, newly composed businessmen, and oligarchy and mafia structures. These new «elites» have no interest in strengthening the institutional state power and democratic procedures, but in preserving the monopoly positions, non-economic privileges and various pseudo-market structures. They use a whole variety of elements of social pathology, from lobbyism, log-rolling with a ruling nomenclature and asymmetric information through occupying strategic positions, to the use of various forms of

power and networks of informal groups. In this way their annuity oriented behaviour is being reproduced.

4. Conclusion

During the period of the post socialism transition, the whole system of inhibiting factors has been working and caused the formation of conglomerate system disfunctionality. The mentioned effect has been synergetic and destructive. The modernization of every transitional economy has its own features and specific development problems and priorities. Their main similarities would be a) long-term and inertial reproduction of crisis development and b) conflicts between formal and informal institutes as their own generator of economic and social crisis.

The story of pluralism (of interests, politics, democracy, freedoms, media etc) has been replaced by the materialistic cynicism of the newly-composed «elites», party centralization and nearly total control (over political and economic processes), which enabled privileges, enrichment of organized minority and impoverishment of the unorganized majority. The story of institutionalization has been turned into it's opposite. Instead of the stabilization of the natural environment, it has been additionally destabilized. Instead of the incrementality of institutional changes, they have been substituted by the growing insecurity, social pathology and crisis. There is one mutual element that each transition economy would, sooner or later, have to change. It is the universal mechanism of pluralistic institutional coordination.

The findings of economic science and crisis economic reality have shown that it is inevitable to have regulation and control over market mechanisms (i. e. the institutionalization of the market as economic institute), if you want to avoid serious economic problems, crisis, unemployment, impoverishment and uncertainty, i. e. reduce the consequences of uncontrolled market actions. In the conditions of general lack of system (organizational, institutional and normative vacuum) in the SEE countries, it wasn't possible to set up efficient economic institutes. The government structures chose to recombine institutes, which enabled the establishment of various forms of quasi-institutional relationships. Focusing on institutional monism (related to market, of dominant neo-liberal type), narrowly privileged motivation and entrepreneurial initiative of rare individuals lead to an immeasurable and long-term crisis consequences.

Rational anti-crisis economic policy has to be based on: consistent developmental strategy, implementation of defensive measures which will, as a priority, take into consideration the so far mistakes, ecologic limitations and social requirements, maximal support to civilization innovations in the area of technology, organization, regulatory mechanisms, political, economic and social relations, saving and rational allocation of resources, modernisation of state regulations, as the main institutional innovation, development of human resources, and change in the way of thinking and behaving.

Only institutional innovations can neutralize party-lobbystic structures and can activate missing control mechanisms, rule of law, economic freedoms and efficient instruments of economic policy.

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Протягом двох десятиліть глибина та інтенсивність кризи, з усіма супроводжуючими хворобливими подіями, не була достатнім попередженням для прихильників неоліберальної політики у сусідніх державах Південно-Східної Європи про те, що дещо є неправильним і що модель «розвитку», у кінцевому рахунку, повинна бути замінена. У статті обговорюються причини та умови, які зруйнували плюралістичну, точніше, моністичну діяльність економічних інститутів у практиці транзитивних країн та призвели до їх об'єктивної заміни квазіінститутами і метайнститутами соціопатологічного характеру. Це підтверджує особливу важливість економічних інститутів для розвитку, так як і для руйнування псевдоінститутів у економічній політиці та підвищення цінності ресурсів. На додаток до цього у статті доводиться очевидність того, що моністичні псевдоринкові реформи постсоціалістичного періоду не мали успіху в компенсації за масштабний встановлений вакуум і що вони навіть вели до його поширення та перетворення на квазіінституціоналізацію, а потім до панування нігілізму. Ми починаємо з гіпотези, що регулювання соціально-економічних процесів у постсоціалістичному переході не розвилось відповідно до з науково-методологічних принципів дуалістичного обговорення зі встановлення монізму та/або примирливого плюралізму, але було повторно піддане об'єднаному й декадентському метайнституту повного контролю правлячої номенклатури, що вело до встановлення нігілізму.

Ключові слова: економічні інститути, інституціональний плюралізм, інституційно-аналітичний монізм, неолібералізм, транзитивні економіки.

В течение двух десятилетий глубина и интенсивность кризиса, со всеми сопровождающими болезненными событиями, не были достаточным предупреждением для сторонников неоллиберальной экономической политики в соседних государствах Юго-Восточной Европы о том, что кое-что неправильно и что модель «развития», в конечном счете, должна быть изменена. В статье обсуждаются причины и условия, которые разрушили плюралистическое, точнее, монистическое действие экономических институтов в практике транзитивных стран и привели к их объективной замене квазиинститутами и метаинститутами социопатологического характера. Это подчеркивает особую важность экономических институтов для развития, также как и для разрушения псевдоинститутов в экономической политике и повышения ценности экономических ресурсов. В дополнение к этому в статье доказывается очевидность того, что монистические псевдорыночные реформы постсоциалистического перехода не преуспели в компенсации за обширный установленный вакуум и что они даже вели к его распространению и превращению в квазиинституционализацию, а затем к господству нигилизма. Мы начинаем с гипотезы, что регулирование социально-экономических процессов в постсоциальном переходе не развилось в соответствии с научно-методологическими принципами дуалистического обсуждения по установлению монизма и/или примирительного плюрализма, но было подвергнуто повторно объединенному и декадентскому метаинституту полного контроля правящей номенклатуры, что вело к установлению нигилизма.

Ключевые слова: *экономические институты, институциональный плюрализм, институциональный монизм, неоллиберализм, транзитивные экономики.*

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